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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. CREER MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
A. Placement of marshaled evidence. 
Orem City (hereafter "the City") argues that Mr. Creer failed to comply with Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure (hereafter "Appellate Rule(s)") 24(a)(9) which provides in part 
that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. . . ." The City argues that this rule requires that "the marshaled 
evidence must be contained in the opening briefs argument section." Appellee's Brief, pp. 
9-10. The City relies on Fitzgeraldv. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301,304 (Utah App. 1987), and 
Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, f!7 n. 11, 54 P13d 1119, to support this argument 
Mr. Creer does not dispute the holdings of the authorities cited and relied upon by the 
City. However, the authorities are simply not applicable in this matter. Fitzgerald and 
Roderick are civil cases in which the appellants were challenging factual findings made by 
the trial court. Fitzgerald, at 302-304, Roderick, at 1125-1129. Appellate Rule 24(a)(9), 
Fitzgerald and Roderick require that an appellant must marshal the evidence that supports 
a challenged finding in the argument section of the brief at the point where the particular 
finding is disputed. Fitzgerald, at 304; and Roderick, at f 47, n.l 1, 54 P.3d 1129, n. 11. 
The City has cited no authority, and Mr. Creer could find none, which requires that 
an appellant challenging a jury verdict in a criminal case marshal the evidence supporting the 
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verdict in the argument section of the appellant's opening brief. This is a criminal case in 
which the jury verdicts are being challenged on appeal. Nothing in Appellate Rule 24(a)(9), 
nor in the authorities cited by the City, requires that the facts supporting the verdict must be 
marshaled and placed in the argument section of the Appellant's Brief. 
B. "Cataloguing" the marshaled evidence. 
The City argues that Mr. Creer failed to "strictly catalogue" the evidence challenging 
the jury verdicts. Appellee's Brief, p. 12. While acknowledging that there is not a particular 
format established to "catalogue" the evidence challenging the verdicts, but nevertheless 
argues that Mr. Creer's opening brief is deficient in this regard. 
The City does not specify what evidence Mr. Creer failed to marshal, or what evidence 
he omitted that should have been included in his opening brief. In fact, Mr. Creer reviewed 
accurately and in detail all the evidence presented during the jury trial. Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 5-9. Mr. Creer did not identify specifically each witness by name, and at times referred 
to "prosecution witnesses" and "defense witnesses" as providing the evidence at trial. 
Nothing in the authorities cited by the City or researched by Mr. Creer required identification 
of witnesses by name or prohibited categorization of witnesses. 
Mr. Creer respectfully submits that he marshaled the evidence in support of the jury 
verdicts and presented the evidence in the fact section of his brief. 
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II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE REGARDING THEFT OF 
SERVICES. 
The section of the criminal code under which Mr. Creer was convicted, and the only 
part of the code for which he could possibly be convicted, for Theft of Services, provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only for 
compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the 
due payment for them. 
U.C.A. 76-6-409(1). To convict Mr. Creer of this crime, the jury had to have received 
evidence that he (1) obtained services, and (2) avoided payment for them by deception, 
threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid payment for them. There was simply no 
evidence presented on either of these issues. 
A. What was the "service" being offered? 
The City argues that the service provided was admission or entry into the building. 
Appellee's Brief, p. 14. Yet, if no event were scheduled at the Center, no admission would 
be charged. The City's argument is also contrary to the definition of "services" provided in 
the statute - "admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for 
which a charge is made." U.C.A. 76-6-409(3). 
The evidence in the trial court was that the event for which admission was required 
was the Utah High School Association state drill team championships. T. 14, 41, 67, 113, 
119,131,135-1236,167,180. Mr. Creer never saw the event, nor attempted to see it without 
paying for it. 
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B. Mr. Creer did not attempt to avoid payment for entry into the event. 
Mr. Creer was not confronted about whether he had a ticket when he entered the entry 
way or foyer or at the doors leading into the arena. T. 136, 138-139. It was only when he 
briefly entered the arena to see if he could locate his wife that he was asked for a ticket. T. 
19-20, 140, 154. 
The undisputed evidence was that he had just arranged to get the money from his wife 
to pay to enter and view the event. T. 20, 86-87, 97, 141-143. Mr. Creer did not avoid or 
attempt to avoid payment for entry into the event. 
III. FAILURE TO GIVE THE REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The City limits its argument and analysis of State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 232 (Utah 
1985), to a future promise to pay. Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-17. This argument was not raised 
by the City in the trial court. 
At trial, the City argued only that the trial court should not give the requested 
instruction because the Leonard case was decided in 1985, and it did not know if the 
subsequent amendments to Theft of Services statute caused the wording of the statute to be 
different now than it was in 1985. T. 201-202. In fact, the statute reads exactly the same 
now as it did in 1985. 
The City also ignores or overlooks the arguments made in the trial court and in Mr. 
Creer's opening brief that the Leonard case also requires that the prosecution prove 
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fraudulent intent to obtain a conviction for theft of services. Leonard, at 654-655. This 
requirement by the Leonard court is consistent with the statute itself. The statue proscribes 
obtaining services and avoiding payment for them by deception, threat, force, or any other 
means designed to avoid the due payment for them. Deception, threat, force, or any other 
means to avoid payment all pertain to and demonstrate fraudulent intent. 
The court stated, "[fraudulent intent is the gravamen of the offense of theft of 
services." Id., at 654. Although the specific facts of the Leonard case differ from the facts 
in this case, the theft of services statute read then exactly as it does now, and the court did 
not limit its requirement of fraudulent intent to only those situations where breach of an 
express or implied contract is at issue. 
The requested instruction was/is required by the Leonard case, and it was error for the 
trial court to refuse to give it. 
IV. EXCLUSION OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE AND/OR PRESENT SENSE 
IMPRESSION HEARSAY TESTIMONY. 
The City argues that the hearsay testimony disallowed by the trial court is harmless 
because the refusal to offer the proffered testimony was similar to testimony presented by the 
other defense witnesses, including Mr. Creer. Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-20, The City also 
argues that a foundation regarding reliability of the declarant must be established. Appellee's 
Brief, pp. 20-21. Again, neither of these arguments were raised by the City in the trial court. 
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At trial the City conceded that the proffered testimony qualified as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. T. 170. This concession was well-founded and consistent with the authority 
and argument made at trial arid in Mr. Creer's opening brief, pp. 16-17, citing West Valley 
City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 2000); T. 170-172. 
"Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors that provide assurances of 
testimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with the usual means of purging testimony of 
error and falsehood." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). The testimonial 
reliability in the proffered testimony at the trial in this matter was sufficient to establish its 
trustworthiness. There was a startling event, the statement was made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement caused by the event, and the statement related to the startling 
event. West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d at 4-5. 
Mr. Creer submits that the proffered evidence is not cumulative. It appears that the 
declarant observed virtually the entire interaction between Mr. Creer and the officers. T. 
170-172. None of the other witnesses observed the entire interaction between Mr. Creer and 
the officers. 
Tracy Gillman did not see or hear anything until the officers took Mr. Creer to the 
ground. T. 169. Brad Ashton did not see or hear any of the interaction with Mr. Creer until 
they were "engaged" in a takedown of Mr. Creer. T. 121. Joyce Backus was not aware of 
anything until the two officers tackled Mr. Creer. T. 132. The first thing she heard was the 
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contact of people going down. T. 133. 
Mr. Creer's version of his interaction with the officers was considerably different 
from the officers' testimony and from that of Wendy Fletcher and Cynthia Uda, all 
prosecution witnesses. The excited utterance and/or present sense impression testimony the 
defense sought to proffer would have enhanced Mr. Creer's credibility and provided 
information not seen or heard by the other witnesses. 
The proffered testimony went to the heart of whether Mr. Creer interfered with or 
resisted his arrest by the officers. The trial court's exclusion of this evidence denied Mr. 
Creer the opportunity rebut the prosecution's witnesses that he refused to comply with the 
officers' commands, and that he resisted their efforts to detain and question him. The 
exclusion of this evidence likewise prevented him from preventing exculpatory evidence 
regarding the interference with arresting officer charge. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the arguments set forth in his opening brief, Bradley 
W. Creer respectfully requests this Court to reverse his convictions for theft of services 
and interference with arresting officer. 
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